Volume 62

Issue 4

Article 20

June 1960

Trial--Unintended Courtroom Influence--When New Trial Warranted
O. A. J.
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
O. A. J., Trial--Unintended Courtroom Influence--When New Trial Warranted, 62 W. Va. L. Rev. (1960).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol62/iss4/20

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

J.: Trial--Unintended Courtroom Influence--When New Trial Warranted
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

subjective interpretation of good faith be preserved, he also would
permit the Board to continue to utilize all relevant acts by the parties
as inferences of good faith, or the lack of it, in bargaining.
C. H. H., II
TRIA-UNTrEDED CouRTOOM INFLUENCE-WHEN NEW TmiAL

WARmANn.-In the trial of an action under the Federal Employers'

Liability Act by an employee against the railroad for the loss of an
eye suffered in the course of employment, a blind man, carrying a
cane and a cigar box, entered the courtroom near the close of D's
case, and took a seat immediately behind one in which P was seated.
The blind man entered the courtroom of his own volition and was
not intentionally brought there for the purpose of influencing the
jury's verdict. Held, reversing judgment for P and remanding the
case for retrial, that in order to warrant a new trial it is not necessary that such courtroom episodes be deliberately contrived for the
purpose of creating sympathy for P or prejudice towards D, nor is it
necessary that it be conclusively shown that members of the jury
were actually influenced thereby. Fitzpatrick v. St. Louis-San
FranciscoRy., 327 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. 1959).
A "fair triar" contemplates that no outside influences shall be
brought to bear upon the jury and that no evidence shall be considered by it other than that presented and admitted at trial. Hinton
v. Gallagher, 190 Va. 421, 57 S.E.2d 131 (1950).
Where extrinsic factors are present, the effect of which may be
to affect unduly the course of the jury's deliberation, the courts have
acknowledged the wholly subjective nature of the problem and
have granted considerable latitude to the discretion of the trial
judge to control the incidents of the trial and his sound exercise
thereof will not be disturbed unless clearly abused. Boecking
Constr. Co. v. Callen, 321 P.2d 970 (Okla. 1958); Plank v. Summers,
203 Md. 598, 102 A.2d 262 (1954).
The courts have often been confronted with a dilemma in such
circumstances in weighing the importance of the factors surrounding the prejudicial incident. Where the jury has been influenced by
irrelevant events, injustice may result from allowing the verdict to
stand, but, conversely, a miscarriage of justice to the successful
party may result from setting aside the verdict. The latter is
especially true where the reprehensible act was without the knowledge or beyond the control of the prevailing party in the action.
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. The courts have been loathe to attempt to construe the delicate
niceties inherent in these situations, and a great majority of the individual cases reflect an approbation of the trial court's considered
judgment. The bulk of the decisions appear to be liberal and,
where the successful litigant is untainted with involvement, the
verdict will generally stand.
The older cases were prone to place infinitely more confidence
in the integrity of the jurors than did the instant case. In Price v.
Lambert, 3 N.J.L. 122 (Sup. Ct. 1809), a constable entered the jury
room while the jurors were debating and wrote on a piece of paper
"that it was a clear case." The jurymen all contended that the paper
had no effect on their verdict, although one juror had some hazy
recollection of additional words having been written on the paper.
The court observed that the conduct of the constable was reprehensible, but there was no reversible error, for the paper did not indicate for which side it was a clear case.
This line of thought was more clearly defined some years later
in Bishop v. Williamson, 11 Me. 495 (1834), which held that there
is no legal ground for disturbing a verdict where one of the jury
has been tampered with unless the acts complained of be done by
one of the parties or his agent, or by his consent and arrangement.
Another aspect of this rule was developed in Clay v. City
Council of Montgomery, 102 Ala. 297, 14 So. 646 (1894), where a
juror was offered a bribe by someone not an agent of the prevailing
party. The court held that, where it appears from the juror's affidavit that he was not influenced thereby, such act is not ground
for a new trial.
The trial court's judgment in denying a new trial has been
affirmed in acknowledgment of a wise exercise of discretion where P
fainted before the jury in the course of the trial, Jefferson Dry Goods
Co. v. Stoess, 304 Ky. 73, 199 S.W.2d 994 (1947); where P broke
down and cried on the witness stand, Schuttler v. Reinhardt, 17
N.J.Super. 480, 86 A.2d 438 (1952); where decedent's widow, who
had no interest in the suit, sat at counsel table with attorney for
decedents administrator, Phillips v. Creighton, 211 Ore. 645, 316
P.2d 302 (1957); and where an investigator employed by P's attorney sat a counsel table, Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Jones,
60 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1952).
In a recent case, Texas EasternTransmission Corp. v. Allen, 282
S.W.2d 338 (Ky. 1955), a person disinterested in the outcome of the

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol62/iss4/20

2

J.: Trial--Unintended Courtroom Influence--When New Trial Warranted
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

trial, doubtless a charitable soul, served soft drinks to the jury during a recess. The court expressed concern that "the personal comfort and convenience of the jurors should always have careful consideration," and held that there was no cause for reversal inasmuch
as the event was not instigated by anyone connected with the trial.
This standpoint is well defended in Dwight v. Ichiyama, 24
Hawaii 193 (1918), where the court observed that to set aside a
proper verdict because a stranger has requested a juror to find a certain way would be an injustice not authorized, and no punishment
to the offender who should be proceeded against for contempt of
court.
Other courts have avoided this view for fear of losing the proper
perspective of the jury's prime function: to render a fair and impartial verdict, the source of its obstruction notwithstanding. In Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Hardwick, 289 Ala. 58, 193 So. 780 (1940),
it was held that, whether the motive was innocent or sinister, any
interference with the jury was improper and judgment was reversed
and the case remanded for new trial.
The most unequivocal statement of this viewpoint was expressed in Lynch v. Kleindolph, 204 Iowa 762, 216 N.W. 2 (1927),
which held, in reversing for retrial, that tampering with a juror
during the progress of a trial, by anyone, is prejudicial error. The
court observed that "all our court proceedings should be like
Caesar's wife, 'above suspicion."'
rhe line of demarcation between the two views is elucidated
in the case of Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Underhill, 234 F.2d 620
(5th Cir. 1956), where an outsider voiced his opinions and observations to the jury during the trial, concluding with the statement that
he was thinking about suing D himself. D's motion for a new trial
was denied and the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, adding that
the trial court's judgment will be reversed only for an abuse of
discretion.
It follows that the rule, in its broad implications, is followed
almost universally, in that the trial court is given broad discretionary power, the exercise of which will rest undisturbed unless abused.
The jurisdictions differ only in the extent to which this discretion
is given unbridled freedom before the courts will declare that it has
been abused. The majority of courts afford the trial judge a greater
degree of latitude.
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This curious situation, the divergence of concepts based upon
the same general premise, has been the provocation of a somewhat
questionable state of the law in West Virginia. This state was first
confronted with the problem in Dower v. Church, 21 W. Va. 23
(1882), where a juror overheard a casual conversation between a
witness in the trial and a stranger, neither of whom knew he was a
juror, in which comments were made concerning the case. On appeal, it was held that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant
a new trial, but it was observed that, had any of the parties or their
friends interferred with any juror with a view of promoting their
interests in any way, the verdict would be set aside without a look
into its merits.
This case, both in its holding and in its dictum that recognized
the possible limitations of the court's discretion under certain circumstances, was entirely consistent with the prevailing view. The
broad discretion afforded the trial court was echoed many years
later in Farley v. Farley, 136 W. Va. 598, 68 S.E.2d 353 (1951).
However, this state of affairs took an unexpected turn some
threescore years after the Dower case in a decision that defies comprehension by those who adhere to a strict code of courtroom
demeanor. In Legg v. Jones, 126 W. Va. 757, 30 S.E.2d 76 (1944),
a juror and his wife, on the day of the trial, were invited to stay
overnight at the home of the wife's girlhood friend, due to a night
session of the jury. They accepted, it occurring to no one at the
time that the hostess was the wife of a defense attorney in the very
case that was in progress. After the verdict was returned that
night, the juror and his wife availed themselves of the hospitality.
The juror's home was ten miles away. P appealed the jury's verdict
for an unsubstantial amount. Inasmuch as P failed to bring this to
the judge's attention until shortly after the verdict was rendered,
the court affirmed the judgment below, with a heroic defence of
the trial court's latitude of freedom, in this manner:
"The attorney was placed in an embrassing position, in
that he could not request the wife of the juror to go elsewhere,
nor could he countermand the invitation given by his wife without violating the rules of courtesy and hospitality. We do not
think that he is subject to serious criticism for the abovementioned reasons."
It is not meet to say that justice miscarried here, nor is it proper
to intimate that such a precedent is dangerous to have upon the
books. It is sufficient to note that West Virginia is possibly among
the more liberal jurisdictions respecting jury conduct and courtroom
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decor. Such freedom of conduct may be considered in contravention to Canon 23 of the West Virginia Code of Professional Ethics
which provides: "All attempts to curry favor with juries by fawning, flattery or pretended solicitude for their personal comfort are
unprofessional." 128 W. Va. xx, xxix (1946).
Itis not anticipated that this decision will be followed to the
extent of allowing or encouraging further indiscretion of this sort
in this state. However, the liberal attitude that was expressed here,
in itself, appears to be more desirable than the improbable holding
of the principal case, in which the latitude given to the trial judge's
discretion was severely restricted and the matter was approached
objectively with disregard to the judge's interpretation of the situation.
The parties who are charged with the considerable expense and
responsibility of preparing and presenting their case in a court of
law should not be shouldered with the unreasonable burden of being
held accountable for the physical and moral shortcomings of every
chance spectator who enters the courtroom. This view would be
practicable only if trials were all conducted in the seclusion of closed
chambers.
Merely on the pretext that a blind man cared to attend the trial,
where by a coincidence the loss of an eye was the basis for the action, where no advantage or prejudice would likely result from the
inauspicious act, to wrest from a party a verdict, obtained after long
and expensive litigation, is scarcely compatible with the due administration of justice.
O. A. J.
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